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REAL ESTATE CONTRACTS-When Recording of a Lien
Instrument is Not Notice to the Whole World-Actual
Notice Required to Protect Second Lien on a Real Estate
Contract: Shindledecker v. Savage
INTRODUCTION

Shindledecker v. Savage' is one of the most recent in a line of cases
concerning the rights of a second lienholder2 under an installment, real
estate, or executory land sales contract. In Shindledecker, the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that under a real estate contract the buyer has a
mortgageable interest in his equity.3 The court also held that a second
lienholder on a real estate contract does not protect his interest by recording the second instrument. A second lienholder instead must use a
contractual device4 to give the original seller actual notice of the second
lien. This is intended to insure that the second lienholder receives both
notice of a breach by the buyer and the opportunity to protect his interest.'
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1975, Bob and Barbara Savage purchased a home from Russel Taylor
under a real estate contract. 6 The Savages agreed to pay $1,500 down
and to make monthly payments on the unpaid balance. Later, the Savages
mortgaged their interest in the property to secure several loans received
from John Shindledecker. At that time the Savages were current in all
their obligations on the contract. Some time after mortgaging their interest
with Shindledecker, the Savages decided to move from the state. Although
they were not in default on the real estate contract with Taylor, at the
time of their move they executed a document that instructed the escrow
agent on that contract to release to Taylor a special warranty ded held
1. 96 N.M. 42, 627 P.2d 1241 (1981).
2. A second lienholder in Shindledecker and other cases cited in this Note is one who has lent
the buyer money and taken an encumbrance on the property junior to the real estate contract to
secure the debt. Id. at 43-44, 627 P.2d at 1242-43. Though sometimes called a second mortgage
holder, even by the Shindledecker court, a second lienholder is different from a second mortgage
holder. See infra text accompanying notes 22-33 for a discussion on the difference between a second
mortgage and a lien on a real estate contract.
3. 96 N.M. at 43, 627 P.2d at 1242.
4. The Shindledecker court said, "Instead, the mortgagee must use one of several available
contractual devices to insure that he receives both notice of a breach by the vendee and the opportunity
to protect his interests." Id. at 44, 627 P.2d at 1243. The court did not say what contractual devices
should be used.
5. Id.
6. Id.at 43, 627 P.2d at 1242. For a discussion of how a real estate contract differs from a
mortgage, see infra text accompanying notes 42-49.
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in escrow.7 That deed conveyed the Savages' interest back to Taylor.
Taylor then sold the property to a party whQ later sold it to the Jacquezes.
From the time Taylor received the special warranty deed 8until he resold
the property, no one made any payments on the contract.
Shindledecker sued the Savages, the Jacquezes, and the holder of the
Jacquezes' mortgage. 9 He asked for and received a judgment on the debts
owed him by the Savages. He also requested, but was denied, a foreclosure against the Jacquezes on the second mortgage he held. He appealed the trial court's refusal to foreclose his mortgage.' 0
The New Mexico Supreme Court held that Shindledecker did have an
enforceable lien1" on the amount of equity held by the Savages. According
to the court, this lien was subject to the prior interest of Taylor and was
also subject to continued performance under the contract. The court also
held that Shindledecker's rights had to yield to the rights of the subsequent
purchasers, the Jacquezes. 2
DISCUSSION
A. The Buyer's Mortgageable Interest
The Shindledecker court said the first issue in the case was whether
the buyer under an executory land sales contract has a mortgageable
interest. Shindledecker argued that he had an interest that was enforceable
against the Savages' equitable interest in the property. 3 The Shindledecker
court said that the Savages did have a mortgageable interest, and that
Shindledecker did have an enforceable lien on that interest, but that it
was not the same as a second mortgage. 4
In considering the Savages' interest, the Shindledecker court first noted
that the majority of courts which have addressed the question have held
that both the legal and equitable owners have mortgageable interests in
7. 96 N.M. at 43, 627 P.2d at 1242.
8. Id.
9. Taylor, the original vendor, was not a party to the action. This fact may, in later cases, limit
the application of the Shindledecker court's holding that the rights of the second lienholder must
yield to the rights of the subsequent purchasers. In fact, all cases cited in the Shindledecker opinion
and all cases cited in this Casenote concerning real estate contracts involved the original seller or
his representative as a party.
10. 96 N.M. at 42, 627 P.2d at 1241.
11. For a discussion of the enforceability of Shindledecker's interest, see infra text accompanying
notes 30-33.
12. 96 N.M. at 44, 627 P.2d at 1243.
13. Id. at 42, 627 P.2d at 1241.
14. Id.at 43-44, 627 P.2d at 1242-43.
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the realty.' 5 The court cited both specific' 6 and general' 7 authority in
support of its position.
The first case the Shindledecker court relied upon was Gavin v. Johnson. 8
In Gavin, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that a party in possession
of land under an agreement to purchase may subject his interest in the
land to an enforceable lien on the property. '"The facts of Gavin were
that Johnson sold two lots to Gifford, one outright and one by a land
sales contract. Gifford built on the lot that was under contract. In the
mortgage he secured for building money, however, Gifford described
instead the lot he had paid for. After a foreclosure, Gavin bought what
he thought was the lot with the building on it. In fact, however, title to
the lot had never vested in Gifford because of his failure to meet the
terms of the contract. Gavin sued to secure titles. Although Johnson
argued that the agreement with Gifford gave no permission to encumber
the lot thus it could not be the one mortgaged and foreclosed, the Gavin
court held that even without such authority a party in possession of land
under an agreement to purchase may subject his interest in it to a lien
that may be enforced.2
The Shindledecker court also relied upon the position taken by the
Washington Supreme Court in Sigman v. Stevens-Norton, Inc.2 ' The Sigman court stated that a purchaser under a real estate contract had a
mortgageable interest, then went on to hold that a lien on that interest is
different from an actual second mortgage.2 2 In Sigman, the plaintiff claimed
he was fraudulently induced to make a loan by representations that the
loan was a safe one secured by a second mortgage on five parcels of real
property. The defendant argued that because a purchaser under a real
estate contract has a mortgageable interest, there is no substantial difference between such a lien and a second mortgage. Although the Washington
15. Id. at 43, 627 P.2d at 1242. Under a real estate contract the seller retains legal title but the
buyer has equitable title. See G. Osborne, G. Nelson & D. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law
§ 3.25 at 79 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Osborne].
16. Gavin v. Johnson, 131 Conn. 489, 41 A.2d 113 (1945); Sigman v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 70
Wash. 2d 915, 425 P.2d 891 (1967).
17. 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages § 111 (1971). This section states that courts recognize the interests
of both the vendor and the vendee under a contract to purchase as mortgageable interests. The court
also cited Annot., 85 A.L.R. 927 (1933) as general authority for its position. The cited annotation
deals with the interest of a vendee under an executory contract as subject to the conditions of a levy
of execution, assessment of a lien adjudged against the property, or attachment.
18. 131 Conn. 489, 41 A.2d 113 (1945).
19. Id. at. -, 41 A.2d at115.
20. Id.
21. 70 Wash. 2d 915, 425 P.2d 891 (1967).
22. Id. at -_,425 P.2d at 894.
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Supreme Court agreed that the purchaser has a mortgageable interest, it
found that there is a crucial difference between a lien taken under a real
estate contract and an actual second mortgage. The difference is that there
is no lien on the fee under a mortgage on a buyer's interest, but only a
lien on the buyer's equitable interest.23 Therefore, relying on Gavin and
Sigman, the Shindledecker court held that the Savages' interest under the
real estate contract was a mortgageable interest, and that Shindledecker
had a valid lien on that interest. 4
The Shindledecker court also held that Shindledecker's lien was not
the same as an actual second mortgage, even though it was called a
second mortgage.25 The Shindledecker court, relying on and quoting from
Sigman, said that an actual second mortgage is a lien on the fee, but that
what Shindledecker had was a lien not on a fee interest but on the buyer's
(the Savages') equitable interest. The Shindledecker court added that
the
Shindledecker's interest was limited by the buyer's interest because
26
buyer cannot create an interest in the realty greater than his own.
The Shindledecker court cited Campos v. Warner, in which the New
Mexico Supreme Court held that a tenant did not have a right to damages
against a seller who cancelled the lease when the buyer rental company
defaulted on its real estate contract. 28 In Campos, the plaintiff leased real
estate from a rental company that had bought the property from Warner,
the defendant, under a contract for deed. When the company defaulted
on the contract, Warner took back the property and refused to honor
Campos' lease. In reversing the trial court's award of damages, the Campos court reasoned that the rental company, which had bought the property
under a real estate contract and leased it to the plaintiff, Campos, could
not create greater interest in Campos by virtue of the lease than it had
originally possessed under the contract. 29
The Shindledecker court also found that because the lien was subject
to the prior interest of the seller under the contract, it was enforceable
only if the contract were kept in force by continued performance of its
terms.3" The Oregon Supreme Court provided the authority for this position in Sheehan v. McKinstry.3" In Sheehan, the court allowed a seller
to foreclose his interest in the property when the buyer defaulted on a
land sales contract. The Sheehan court allowed this foreclosure despite
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
96 N.M. at 44, 627 P.2d at 1243.
Id. at 43, 627 P.2d at 1242.
Id.
90 N.M. 63, 559 P.2d 1190 (1977).
Id. at 64, 559 P.2d at 1191.
Id.
96 N.M. at 43, 627 P.2d at 1242.
105 Or. 473, 210 P. 167 (1922).
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a second lien on the buyer's interest because the second lienholder had
four months within which to meet the terms of the contract but failed to
do so. The Sheehan court said the enforceability of the buyer's second
mortgage was subject to performance of the terms of the contract.32
Therefore, the Shindledecker court said, Shindledecker had a valid lien
on the Savages' interest, limited to the extent of their interest, but subject
to Taylor's interest, and subject to continued performance of the contract. "
This first holding by the Shindledecker court is welcome. It states
unequivocally for New Mexico a position long held by most other jurisdictions, as shown by the range of authority cited by the Shindledecker
court.
B. Actual Notice Requirement
Having laid the foundation regarding the extent of Shindledecker's
rights, the court then addressed the issue of whether Shindledecker had
an enforceable claim in the nature of a foreclosable mortgage against the
subsequent purchasers. Shindledecker argued that his lien should be declared superior to the claims of the other defendants and that it should
be foreclosed.34 The New Mexico Supreme Court said Shindledecker's
claim was not enforceable against the subsequent purchasers because he
did not protect his lien by giving actual notice to the seller, Taylor.3 5 In
addition, Shindledecker argued that the court should use its powers of
equity to enforce his mortgage. The court, however, said the equities in
the case favored the Jacquezes, the innocent purchasers. 36
Before denying Shindledecker's claim, the court again recognized that
his interest was legitimate. It emphasized this legitimacy by noting that
although generally a seller under a real estate contract has the right to
retake the property when a buyer defaults, this right to retake is limited
where, as here, the buyer has mortgaged his equitable interest. The right
to retake is limited in that the holder of the lien has the right to assume
the position of the buyer.37
32. Id. at __, 210 P. at 171.
33. 96 N.M. at 43-44, 627 P.2d at 1242-43.
34. Id. at 42, 627 P.2d at 1241.
35. Id. at 44, 627 P.2d at 1243. Ironically, the record suggests that Taylor did have actual notice.
Transcript of Proceedings at 33. Shindledecker v. Savage, 96 N.M. 42, 627 P.2d 1241 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Transcript] (on file at the University of New Mexico law library). The Shindledecker court, however, noted that Taylor was not a party to the action, and therefore the court
could not grant any relief which might be due to Shindledeckeer from Taylor, 96 N.M. at 43, 627
P.2d at 1242.
36. 96 N.M. at 44, 627 P.2d at 1243.
37. Id.
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1. Enforceability of the claim
The court began its analysis of the conflict by citing Bishop v. Beecher3"
for the proposition that the vendor under a property sales contract can,
on default by the purchaser, retake the property and retain all payments
made under the contract. 3" In Bishop, the plaintiff, Bishop, purchased a
house under a real estate contract. When he defaulted, the defendant
Beecher tried to take back the property under the terms of the contract.
Bishop sued to have the contract declared an equitable mortgage so that
he would be allowed a right of redemption for a reasonable period of
time. Although Bishop had paid about one-third of the total of the contract,
the court affirmed the trial court's ruling that there was no equitable right
of redemption.40 The Bishop court said that it would not rewrite a contract
into which the parties freely entered, and with which Bishop failed to
comply. The court noted that the amount Bishop had paid, less than $60
a month over six years, was a reasonable amount for rent. It also stated
that such real estate contracts benefit thousands of persons who would
otherwise be unable to buy homes. 4'
The Bishop case makes clear the difference between a real estate contract and a mortgage or second mortgage. An explanation of this difference
will facilitate an understanding of both the Bishop and Shindledecker
cases.
The real estate contract has been referred to as "the most commonly
used substitute for the mortgage or deed of trust." 42 In New Mexico, a
mortgage of real estate is used as security for payment of a debt, giving
both legal title and the right of possession to the person paying the
mortgage.43 Under a real estate contract, legal title remains with the seller,
but the buyer has the right of possession."
The main difference between the two, as demonstrated in Bishop, is
that a defaulting mortgagor has a right to redeem his interest in the
38. 67 N.M. 339, 355 P.2d 277 (1960).
39. 96 N.M. at 44, 627 P.2d at 1243.
40. Under New Mexico law an equitable right of redemption is the right of a person who has
had his mortgaged property sold in a foreclosure sale to redeem, or buy back, the property within
nine months of the sale. He can do it by paying the foreclosure buyers directly or by petitioning
the court. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 39-5-18 (1978).
41. 67 N.M. at 342-43, 355 P.2d at 279-80.
42. Osborne, supra note 15, § 3.25 at 79. The authors state:
[t]he installment land contract and the purchase money mortgage fulfill the
identical economic function-the financing by the seller of the unpaid portion of
the real estate purchase price. Under an installment land contract, the vendee
normally takes possession and makes monthly installment payments of principal
and interest until the principal balance is paid off. The vendor retains legal title
until the final payment is made, at which time full title is conveyed to the vendee.
Id.
43. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §48-7-1 (1978).
44. Osborne, supra note 15, § 3.25 at 79.
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property. The mortgagee can eliminate this equitable right of redemption
only by a foreclosure proceeding, should the mortgagor prove to be
uncooperative. Even then, the mortgagor still has a right to redeem within
a certain period after the sale, which is nine months in New Mexico.45
The real estate or land installment contract, on the other hand, normally
has a forfeiture clause that typically provides that "time is of the essence. "46 When a vendee fails to comply with the terms of the contract,
the vendor may terminate the contract, retake possession of the premises
without legal process, and keep all prior payments as liquidated damages.
The clause gives the vendor a remedy similar to foreclosure without any
need for judicial action.47
Under New Mexico practice, the vendor executes a warranty deed at
closing that conveys the property to the buyer. The buyer simultaneously
executes a special warranty deed conveying his interest in the property
back to the seller. Both these deeds are held by an escrow agent who
collects the payments. In the case of default, or if authorized by the buyer,
the escrow agent releases the special warranty deed to the seller after he
has complied with the contract forfeiture requirement.4 8 If the buyer pays
the contract in full, the escrow agent releases the warranty deed to him.4 9
The Shindledecker court stated that the seller's rights under the contract
were somewhat limited in this case. Where the buyer has mortgaged his
45. N.M. Stat. Ann. §39-5-18 (1978).
46. 67 N.M. at 340, 355 P.2d at 278.
47. Nelson and Whitman, The Installment Contract-ANational Viewpoint, 1977 B.Y.U. L. Rev.
541.
The contract involved in this case is not in the court record, but the Bishop court noted that the
contract in question in that case was the "usual type." The Bishop contract stated that time was of
the essence and, upon default of payment by the vendees continuing for 30 days after written demand,
the vendor may:
at his option, either declare the whole amount remaining unpaid to be then due
and proceed to enforce the payment of the same; or he may terminate this contract
and retain all sums theretofore paid hereunder as rental to that date for the use
of said premises, and all rights of the purchaser in the premises herein described
shall thereupon cease and terminate and they shall thereafter be deemed a tenant
holding over after the expiration of their term without permission.
67 N.M. at 340, 355 P.2d at 278.
48. In Shindledecker, the Savages, who were the original purchasers of the property under the
real estate contract, authorized the release of the warranty deed from escrow. 96 N.M. at 43, 627
P.2d at 1242.
49. In a standard real estate contract, the pertinent paragraph reads:
13. It is understood and agreed that, coincident herewith, the Owner has executed a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the above-described premises
to the Purchaser, which said deed, together with a copy hereof, shall be placed
in escrow with __, who is hereby designated and appointed escrow agent, to be
delivered by the Escrow Agent to the Purchaser upon full compliance on his part
with all the conditions of this contract. In consideration of that fact the said
Purchaser executes, coincident herewith, a special warranty deed reconveying the
above described premises to the Owner, which said special warranty deed shall
also be placed in escrow herewith to be delivered by the Escrow Agent to the
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equitable interest to a third party, as the Savages did here, the seller and
buyer cannot get together and agree to rescind the outsider's lien or
mortgage. 5" Instead, the mortgagee acquires the original purchaser's right
to buy the property under the terms set out in the contract, thus assuming
the rights of the buyer under the contract.5 '
The Shindledecker court adopted and quoted the reasoning in First
Mortgage Corp. of Stuart v. deGive52 as authority for its position. In
deGive the seller, deGive, had sold real property to O'Connor under a
land sales contract. O'Connor then mortgaged his interest as security for
two loans received from a mortgage company. Later, he conveyed his
interest back to deGive. A successor to the mortgage company sued
deGive to try to foreclose on the mortgage. The district court of appeals
reversed the trial court's summary decree for deGive. In doing so, it
stated that O'Connor's conveyance of his interest back to deGive could
not cut off the mortgage company's interest. It also defined the mortgage
company's rights in a paragraph, quoted by the Shindledecker court, in
which it said that the mortgagee had the right to complete the purchase
if the mortgagor refused to do so, and that enforceability of the mortgage
depended on keeping the contract in force by performing its terms.53
In applying the deGive reasoning to this case, the Shindledecker court
recognized Shindledecker's right to assume the Savages' position under
the contract. The court then held that Shindledecker's rights must yield
to those of the subsequent purchasers of the property. The court reasoned
that the mortgagee must protect his interest by providing adequate notice
to the original seller and found that Shindledecker's recording of the
mortgage was not adequate notice.54 The court further reasoned that the
equities favored the Jacquezes, as subsequent purchasers of the property."
The Shindledecker court found that the mortgagee of an equitable
interest must protect his lien by giving actual notice to the sellers. This
Owner in the event that the said Purchaser defaults as hereinabove set forth, and
remains in default for a period of days after written demand for payment as
provided for in paragraph 8.
Real Estate Contract-Form 103 (Revised 7-76). This contract, obtained from a stationery store, is
merely representative of a standard real estate contract. Similar form contracts are available from
the Realtors Association of New Mexico.
50. 96 N.M. at 44, 627 P.2d at 1243.
51. Id.
52. 177 So. 2d 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
53. Id. at 746; 96 NM. at 44, 627 P.2d at 1243.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 56-71, regarding the court's requirement of actual notice.
Although the court never explicitly said that Shindledecker failed to give adequate notice, such a
conclusion is implied in the rationale.
55. 96 N.M. at 44, 627 P.2d at 1243.
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enables the seller to arrange for an assumption of the contract by a third
party, if the original buyer defaults or refuses to continue performance
under its terms. The court expressly rejected the argument that recording
serves as notice56 when it stated that, "[r]ecording the mortgage does not
give the vendor constructive notice such as to require57the vendor to notify
the mortgagee of his intent to retake the property."
2. Rights must yield
a. failure to give adequate notice
The Shindledecker court did not give its reasoning behind requiring actual
notice rather than constructive notice. However, the New Mexico Supreme Court's rationale in Romero v. Sanchez, 8 a case not cited in
Shindledecker, may provide an answer. The Romero court held that the
recording of an instrument is constructive notice to subsequent purchasers
and encumbrancers only and does not affect prior parties. In Romero, the
Romeros executed a deed to the Sanchezes, who agreed to buy the land
in question. Fifteen years later, after the Sanchezes had paid only $400
of the total agreed price of $10,000, the Romeros sued to set aside the
deed on the basis of fraud. The Romeros alleged that the Sanchezes
defrauded them by assuring them that they had to execute the deed for
tax purposes, but that the deed could not and would not be recorded, but
by then going ahead and recording the deed. At trial, the Sanchezes
successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the statute
of limitations had run since the date of recording, which is notice to all
the world. The Romeros argued that the fraud limitation should be based
on actual discovery. The New Mexico Supreme Court agreed and said
the purpose of the recording statutes was to inform those persons who
are bound to check the records, and not to be a haven for those who
would commit fraud against those who, because they were earlier in the
chain of title, had no reason to check the records.5 9
The Romero reasoning that recording of an instrument is constructive
notice to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers only and does not
affect prior parties was similar to the reasoning underlying Kendrick v.
Davis,' the Washington case the Shindledecker court cited for its re56. The trial court record showed that the second mortgage was recorded in this case. Record of
Proceedings at 47, Shindledecker v. Savage, 96 N.M. 42, 627 P.2d 1241 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Record] (on file at the University of New Mexico law library).
57. 96 N.M. at 44, 627 P.2d at 1243.
58. 83 N.M. 358, 492 P.2d 140 (1971).
59. Id. at 359-62, 492 P.2d at 141-44.
60. 75 Wash. 2d 456, 452 P.2d 222 (1969).
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quirement of actual notice. The Kendrick court reasoned that "[t]he recording of an instrument is constructive notice only to those parties acquiring
interests subsequent to the filing and recording of the instrument. The
recording of an instrument does not constitute notice to antecedents in
the chain of title." 6 In Kendrick, plaintiff Kendrick, the personal representative of the deceased seller under a real estate contract, sought to
quiet title and regain possession of the property involved after default by
defendant Davis. Davis had mortgaged his interest to a finance company.
When the finance company was named defendant, it tendered to the court
the amount due on the contract, showing it was not only willing but also
able to complete the contract on which Davis had defaulted. The finance
company had recorded the instrument with which Davis transferred his
interest. The trial court removed Davis from the contract because of the
default and inserted the finance company, which held his interest, to take
his place, thus denying possession to Kendrick. In reversing that judgment
and giving Kendrick the property, the Kendrick court held that the finance
company, holder of a recorded second lien on a real estate contract, was
not entitled to possession after the buyer's default because it had failed
to give the seller actual notice of its interest. 62
The reasoning underlying Kendrick was nominally the same as that
underlying Romero: that recording is good as constructive notice only to
subsequent parties. Despite the similarity, the Shindledecker court neither
cited nor relied upon the Romero case. The reason the court failed to cite
Romero is unclear. The omission may be because the Kendrick decision
dealt directly with second liens on real estate contracts, while the Romero
case dealt with fraud.
It is also possible that the Shindledecker court considered notice to be
a minor issue because Taylor, the original vendor, was not a party to the
suit. At trial, Shindledecker argued that the Savages and Taylor had agreed
that Shindledecker could assume the real estate contract for satisfaction
of the debt and the second mortgage. Proof of such an agreement would
go far toward proving Shindledecker's interest. The court noted that
because Taylor was not a party to the lawsuit, it could not grant the relief
Shindledecker might otherwise be due from Taylor.63 Thus, the special
facts of the case, that the original seller was not a party and innocent
purchasers were involved, seem to have greatly influenced the court's
decision.
Whatever the Shindledecker court's reasons for citing Kendrick, the
use of that decision seems surprising because several commentators have
criticized the Kendrick case and its holding. One commentator suggested
61. Id. at __ 452 P.2d at 228.
62. Id. at __, 452 P.2d at 224-27.
63. 96 N.M. at 43, 627 P.2d at 1242. Taylor had moved to Missouri and resisted several requests
to return for the suit. Transcript at 19-22.
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that the decision could open the door to fraudulent schemes, such as a
seller's setting up a strawman buyer who would mortgage his interest,
default, allow the seller to exercise the forfeiture clause, and leave the
second lienholder with nothing, even if he had recorded his lien instrument.' This criticism is not well taken, however, because both the Kendrick and Shindledecker decisions protect against such a scheme as long
as actual notice is given. If the mortgagee gives actual notice to the seller,
the seller is protected by having an opportunity to take over the contract
if the buyer defaults. In addition, the Shindledecker court would require
the mortgagee to use one of several available contractual devices to insure
that he receives both notice of a breach by the buyer and the opportunity
to protect his interests.65 The court did not specify what devices it had
in mind, but the most logical one would be for the mortgagee to have
the seller sign any lien instruments executed on the property. This would
protect a mortgagee's interest against any strawman scheme because his
lien would be upheld in court under the Shindledecker and Kendrick
decisions.
Another commentator argued that actual notice should not be the rule
because when a seller seeks forfeiture he usually hires a lawyer. Thus,
he should be held to the knowledge a lawyer would ordinarily provide,
that of constructive notice and a search of the records. 66 The commentator
failed to note, however, that while mortgages are historically based on
property law, real estate contracts are primarily based on contract law.
Contracting parties can, and usually do, operate without lawyers as long
as the contracts are clear and easy to follow. While the language of the
typical real estate contract may be hard to understand at first, once the
provisions are explained they are clear and easily followed. Courts almost
always encourage freedom of contract and so the parties in a real estate
be free to follow their instrument without the necessity
contract should
67
of a lawyer.
The same point blunts the criticism set forth by the dissenting judge
in Kendrick, who criticized the majority opinion because it "ignores the
practicalities of our time and the importance of a title search in all realestate transactions." 68 The dissent in Kendrick ignores the situation under
a real estate contract, where forfeiture has no effect on the seller, who
always retains legal title in himself. Therefore, a title search by the seller
5 Gonz.
64. Note, Recorded Interests in Real Estate-Notice to the "Whole World" Except.
L. Rev. 289, 300 (1970).
65. 96 N.M. at 44, 627 P.2d at 1243.
66. Note, Mortgages-Mortgageof a Vendee's Interest in an Installment Land Contract-Mortgagee's Rights Upon Default, 43 Mo. L. Rev. 371, 374 (1978).
67. The Bishop court, as noted earlier, recognized this aspect when it stated that it would not
rewrite a contract into which the parties had freely entered. See supra text accompanying notes 3841.
68. 75 Wash. 2d at -, 452 P.2d at 229.
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would not be necessary in ordinary real estate contract transactions unless
a second mortgage is taken under such a contract.
The Shindledecker court's reliance on Kendrick is not so troubling for
the above-mentioned criticisms as it is for the reasoning underlying the
Kendrick holding. The Shindledecker court did not give its reasons for
holding that actual notice is required, but the Kendrick rationale is that
constructive notice should apply not to antecedents in the chain of title,
but only to subsequent purchasers. In the Shindledecker case, however,
the defendants, the Jacquezes, were subsequent purchasers, 69 and were
not antecedents in the chain of title. It is not clear why actual notice
should be required in such a case. The Shindledecker court also stated
that a title search would not have revealed the second mortgage to the
Jacquezes. This statement is inconsistent with the district court's findings
that the second mortgage was recorded.7" If the lower court's finding is
correct, a proper title search should have revealed the existence of a
second mortgage, and the Jacquezes should have been charged with the
knowledge a proper title search would have provided. In addition, the
Shindledecker court went against the prevailing position that a seller must
notify a buyer's mortgagee before declaring a forfeiture.7"
It may be that the Shindledecker court was swayed by the equities in
the case, although the Shindledecker court failed to give its reasoning for
requiring actual notice. The Kendrick reasoning appears to be inapplicable
to the Shindledecker facts. These shortcomings, along with the court's
reliance on the heavily criticized Kendrick holding, and its failure to
require proper title searches by the subsequent purchasers or the original
seller all seem to imply that the Shindledecker decision probably depended
more on the equities than on the law of actual or constructive notice.
b. equities
In the last substantive paragraph of the Shindledecker opinion, the
court considered whether the equities in the case favored Shindledecker
over the subsequent purchasers. Shindledecker argued that they favored
enforcement of his lien. The court, however, said the equities favored
the Jacquezes, the innocent purchasers. The court said Shindledecker
69. 96 N.M. at 43, 627 P.2d at 1242.
70. Record at 47.
71. See, e.g., Stannard v. Marboe, 159 Minn. 119, 198 N.W. 127 (1924). In Stannard, defendant
Marboe had sold some property to a third party under a land sales contract. That buyer mortgaged
his interest to Stannard, who recorded his instrument. Later the buyer defaulted, and Marboe took
back the property without notifying Stannard. Stannard then sued, and the Minnesota Supreme Court
found that the seller was required to notify Stannard before foreclosure so that Stannard could
exercise his rights to take up the contract.
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could have taken the necessary steps to put Taylor on notice to protect
against a default, but that the Jacquezes did not know of any agreements
among the other three principals and a title search would have revealed
nothing to indicate possible defects in their title.72 Thus, the decision
clearly favors a bonafide purchaser over the holder of a second lien. The
Shindledecker court did not cite to any cases for protection of such purchasers, possibly because Shindledecker is the first New Mexico case
concerning protection of bona fide purchasers against previous liens.
Other New Mexico cases dealing with bona fide purchasers concern mainly
the validity and recording of deeds rather than lien instruments, and the
most typical and extensive is Mosley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.73 In
Mosley, plaintiff Mosley and others sought to quiet title to an interest in
the minerals under a tract of land and to cancel deeds purporting to transfer
those mineral interests. Mosley claimed that when he originally conveyed
part of his mineral interest, the purchaser somehow got the deed from
the escrow agent and changed it to convey the entire mineral interest.
The petroleum company said that Mosley later learned of the altered
deed, which was recorded, and should have corrected the problem so
that in any later conveyances purchasers knew that not all the mineral
rights were being conveyed. 74 The company claimed that it was a bona
fide purchaser. The Mosley court, however, held that the company was
not a purchaser and had no semblance of title because the deed was void.
It added that the application of the doctrine of bona fide purchasers for
value without notice is limited to parties who purchase legal title to
property without notice of outstanding equities, or knowledge of facts
that charge them with such notice.75 Otherwise, the court said, the doctrine
of "buyer beware" applies and the burden of securing good title is on
the purchaser.76 Therefore, the authority in New Mexico puts the burden
on the purchaser, but the doctrine of bona fide purchaser acts as a shield
by which the purchaser of a legal title may protect himself against the
holder of an equity interest.77
Apparently this reasoning can apply to the Shindledecker case. Although Shindledecker's lien instrument was recorded and was not fraudulent, as was the deed in Mosley, the Jacquezes were later innocent
purchasers who bought legal title which could be enforced against Shin72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

96 N.M. at 44, 627 P.2d at 1243.
45 N.M. 230, 114 P.2d 740 (1941).
Id. at 236-40, 114 P.2d at 746-50.
Id. at 250, 114 P.2d at 760.
ld. at 245, 114 P.2d at 755.
Id. at 251, 114 P.2d at 761.
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dledecker's equitable claim. In addition, the Shindledecker court said a
title search would have revealed nothing to indicate possible defects in
the Jacquezes' title. 78
Other aspects also seem to make the equities favor the Jacquezes. For
example, Shindledecker had a valid judgment against the Savages for the
debts owned him.79 He won the judgment in district court, and that part
of the decision was not appealed. The Savages were parties to the suit
and apparently were available to Shindledecker for execution on the
judgment. The court seemed to see no difficulty in Shindledecker's collecting on the judgment. Perhaps the New Mexico Supreme Court thought
it would be more fair to leave Shindledecker with his judgment and the
Jacquezes with their home than to give Shindledecker both the judgment,
which was not appealed, and the property.
In addition, the court noted that no one made any payments on the
contract from the time the Savages gave up their rights to the time Taylor
sold the property,80 a period of more than two months. 8 ' Therefore, Shindledecker made no payments on the contract, although, as the court noted
earlier, he was required to keep the contract in force by the subsequent
82
performance of its terms to maintain the enforceability of his lien.
Furthermore, the record indicates that certain considerations not expressed in the opinion may have been essential to the court's decision,
especially considering the equities. For instance, the court may have
decided and left unsaid that Shindledecker's real complaint was with
Taylor, the original seller. The record suggests that Taylor had actual
knowledge of Shindledecker's interest and that the two had talked about
it both before and after the Savages' release of the special warranty deed.83
Taylor's failure to appear in court, however, made the matter impossible
to litigate in this case. 84
Therefore, although the Shindledecker court dealt with the equities in
only one paragraph, other aspects of the opinion and suggestions in the
record show that the decision probably hinged on the equities of the case.
Assuming that it did, then the holding of the case that the holder of a
lien on a buyer's equitable interest in a real estate contract must protect
his interest by giving actual notice to the seller would be limited. It may
78. 96 N.M. at 44, 627 P.2d at 1243.
79. Id. at 42, 627 P.2d at 1241.
80. Id. at 43, 627 P.2d at 1242.
8L. Transcript at 33.
82. 96 N.M. at 44, 627 P.2d at 1243 (citing First Mortgage Corporation of Stuart v. deGive, 177
So. 2d at 746).
83. Transcript at 23-33.
84. 96 N.M. at 43, 627 P.2d at 1242. Taylor had moved to Missouri and resisted several requests
to return for the suit. Transcript at 19-22.
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possibly apply only in the case of subsequent, bona fide purchasers, and
it may be that it will only apply when the original seller is not a party.
CONCLUSION
The Shindledecker court held that the buyer under a real estate contract
has a mortgageable interest in his equity. It also held that a holder of a
lien on that equitable interest does not protect his interest by recording
the lien instrument, commonly called a "second mortgage," but instead
must use a contractual device to give the original seller actual notice of
the second lien. The holding that a buyer under a real estate contract has
a mortgageable interest followed the majority position and served merely
to make it clear in New Mexico that such an interest would be recognized
as mortgageable, as it is recognized in most other jurisdictions. The
Shindledecker court also followed the majority when it said that the
mortgageable interest is limited by the buyer's interest, and that rather
than a lien on a fee the second lienholder has a lien on an equitable
interest, and the enforceability of his interest depends on keeping the
contract in force by continued performance of its terms. The requirement
for actual notice seems to go against the idea of recording as "notice to
all the world," and contradicts the majority position that the seller in a
real estate contract is required to search the record and notify any interest
holders before foreclosing. The Shindledecker holding may be limited,
however, in that the court did not give its reason for requiring actual
notice and by the special facts of the case.
WILLIAM M. CASEY

